Abstract. At Crypto'97 Boneh and Franklin proposed a protocol to e ciently generate shared RSA keys. In the case of two parties, the drawback of their scheme is the need of an independent third party. Furthermore, the security is guaranteed only if the three players follow the protocol. In this paper, we propose a protocol that enables two parties to evaluate any algebraic expression, including an RSA modulus, along the same lines as in the Boneh-Franklin protocol. Our solution does not need the help of a third party and the only assumption we make is the existence of an oblivious transfer protocol. Furthermore, it remains robust even if one of the two players deviates from the protocol.
Introduction
The general problem of private multi-party computation has motivated many solutions for ten years. In 1986, Yao 26] proved the existence of secure twoparty protocols assuming the computational intractability of factoring large integers. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 16] generalized this result and showed that trapdoor functions enable to evaluate any function whose inputs are privately owned by the parties, provided a majority of them is honest. The next year, Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson 2] and independently Chaum, Cr epeau and Damg ard 8] solved the same problem under an information-theoretic approach. Then, many papers improved the needed assumptions 18], the theoretical bounds for subclasses of functions 9] or the simplicity and the e ciency of the methods 13] .
The aim of all those papers is to solve any multi-party computation problem. Accordingly the rst step is always the description of the function to be privately evaluated as a logical circuit or as a polynomial over a nite eld. This enables to reduce the problem to a very small set of elementary protocols, like the computation of the logical AND of two bits, at the cost of polynomial but unpractical solutions. Consequently, even if the problem of multi-party computation is theoretically solved, the design of more speci c but also more e cient protocols appears necessary.
Boneh and Franklin 5] followed this \application oriented" approach to solve the problem of generating shared RSA keys. More precisely, some parties want to jointly generate an RSA modulus N = pq where p and q are prime in such a way that, at the end of the computation, the parties are convinced that N is indeed a product of two large primes but none of them knows its factorization. They use the general protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson 2] to prove that the distributed computation of N by two parties can be e ciently done with the help of a third party, assuming the three players do not collude and follow the protocol. They also prove that the test N = pq with p and q two prime numbers can be e ciently done by two honest parties alone, using a clever probabilistic algorithm variant of the Miller-Rabin and the Solovay-Strassen ones, under the assumption that the quadratic residuosity problem is computationally hard to solve. Finally, they show how two parties can generate shared secret keys, by themselves for small public exponents and with the help of a third party in the general case. An experimental evaluation of the performance can be found in 24] . It shows that a 1024-bit modulus N can be generated in only 10 minutes with Sparc 20 machines.
Independently Cocks 10, 11] has proposed another solution for the same problem that only involves two honest players but assuming the computational intractability of a problem weaker than RSA. This protocol is analyzed and improved in 4].
More recently, Frankel, MacKenzie and Yung 15] have improved the security of the Boneh-Franklin protocol. Their generation scheme is e cient and robust even when a minority of parties are malicious. But in the case of only two parties, both of them have to be honest.
Our Results
For many applications, the protocol of Boneh and Franklin does not provide an accurate level of security for two reasons. Firstly, it needs an independent and honest third party. Secondly, the security is guaranteed only if the three players do not deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we show how two parties can e ciently generate shared RSA keys even if one of them is dishonest. From a theoretical point of view, we only assume the existence of oblivious transfer protocols.
From a practical point of view, our scheme is less e cient than the BonehFranklin protocol based on the Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson construction 2] which is itself based on arithmetical computation in nite elds. Anyway our protocol is much more e cient, especially when we focus on the number of rounds of communication, than those derived from general techniques.
The paper is organized as follows: we rst recall the notion of an ANDOS protocol. Then we propose an e cient and general protocol for the distributed evaluation of algebraic expressions by two parties. We prove its security when the players are honest but also its robustness when one of them is malicious. Then, we use this protocol to generate shared RSA keys. Finally we compare the e ciency of our scheme with general 2-party computation protocols. We also propose in an appendix another solution, much more simple and e cient but less general, based on the higher residue cryptosystem of Naccache and Stern 19] .
All-or Nothing Disclosure of Secrets Protocols
Oblivious transfer has been introduced in 1981 by Rabin 21] and a speci c version, namely the oblivious transfer of one bit out of two 14], soon emerged as a very useful cryptographic primitive for many applications 18]. Brassard, Cr epeau and Robert generalized this notion in various natural ways 7] and they proved the equivalence of those protocols in an information theoretic sense 6].
All-or Nothing Disclosure of Secrets (ANDOS) protocols 7] address the following problem: a merchant has n secret bit-strings and wishes to sell one of them to a buyer who has the ability to choose which one he wants. There are two privacy requirements: the merchant does not want the buyer to obtain information about any other secret and the buyer does not want the merchant to learn anything about the string he has chosen. Oblivious transfer, and consequently ANDOS, can be based on various assumptions like the existence of trapdoor functions 16], of noisy channels 12] or of quantum channels 3]. From a practical point of view, e cient implementation can be based on the quadratic residuosity problem 7, 25] or on the Di e-Hellman assumption 1, 23] .
In this paper we use ANDOS as a cryptographic primitive. In order to formalize its properties, let us consider that Alice sells a secret to Bob. Using the terminology of 17], we de ne the view of Alice to be everything she sees during the execution of the protocol. Let V iew A be the random variable whose value is this view. It depends on the secrets s 1 ; :::s n sold by Alice, on the index i B of the secret bought by Bob and on the random tape ! A of Alice considered as a polynomial time Turing machine. We also use the three well-known notions of indistinguishability of random variables: the perfect one, the statistical one and the computational one (see 17] for complete de nitions). In the paper, we just talk about indistinguishability without any other precision for simplicity reasons but all the de nitions and proofs hold in the three models and the choice of one of them only depends on the properties of the underlying ANDOS.
We model the ANDOS protocol as a scheme that enables Alice to sell one (1) Alice randomly chooses ( A ; A ) 2 Z P Z P (the coe cients of a secret line). we say that the protocol ends successfully. Otherwise, the protocol fails and the players stop cooperation.
Security Analysis for Honest Players
We rst consider that Alice and Bob behave honestly, i.e. follow the protocol. Proof. We show how to simulate Alice's view but the same proof holds for Bob. The simulator randomly chooses B 2 Z P , B Before proving the correctness of the protocol, let us state a lemma whose proof comes from elementary algebra arguments and that essentially says that the intersection of two non-parallel lines is reduced to one point in (Z P ) Lemma 7. If Alice has a cheating strategy such that the protocol ends successfully with probability ", she is pseudo-honest with probability greater than "? Alice is pseudo-honest the protocol is successful so the result of a successful execution is correct with probability 1 ?
1 "(P?1) .
u t Dealing with multiparty computation, an important characteristic is how fair the protocol is. During the shared generation of RSA keys, neither Alice nor Bob can take advantage to stop the interaction before the normal end because such keys cannot be used alone. So our protocol is unfair but it does not matter since our aim is not to design a general multiparty computation scheme but rather to obtain a scheme with no more properties than those needed for the generation of shared RSA keys. Proof. We already said in lemma 7 that the probability distribution of t depends on y A . Furthermore, for randomly chosen ( B ; B ) 2 Z P Z P and for any xed Proof. Let dA;t be the random variable equal to the number of e d correctly computed by Alice according to the revealed line y = A :x + A mod P, i.e. such that e d = A f(d A ; d) + A mod P. For xed d A and t, the probability for Alice to be pseudo-honest is exactly = if she reveals f y A = y A so the probability " 0 for Alice to be pseudo-honest is less than P dA;t Prfd A ; tg = .
Furthermore, if the protocol is successful, she exactly learns that e dB has been correctly computed and consequently learns that d B belongs to a set of size . In order to estimate the information Alice learns in addition to the result f(d A ; d B ), we evaluate the expected value of log in case of success, E(log =success) = 1 " P dA;t Prfd A ; tg log . A convexity inequality applied to the function F(x) = x log x shows that E(log =success) 1 " F(" 0 )
" ?
log(" ? 1 P ? 1 ) + log u t Furthermore, it is important to notice that, if the nal veri cation fails, Bob is convinced that Alice has tried to cheat because the protocol is always successful when the players behave honestly.
Theorem 10 does not prove strict privacy because, with non negligible probability, a malicious player can obtain a few bits about the other player's secret without being caught. But, if we consider Alice and Bob as polynomial time Turing machines and if the probability of success is non-negligible, Alice does not learn much more information than what she could have guessed. 
Computation of Shared RSA Keys
The computation of shared RSA keys by two parties can be e ciently performed using the protocol of the previous section. The rst step consists in computing a candidate N = (p A + p B ) (q A + q B ) and then to test whether N is the product of two prime numbers. Such a test has be proposed by Boneh and Franklin. Then, the second part of the generation consists in computing a shared secret key associated with a public exponent e. is an algebraic expression so that we can use the e cient protocol described in section 2. This solves the problem of the e cient computation a shared RSA modulus by only two parties, even if one of them is malicious.
Trial Division Test
Since Alice and Bob rst choose their private data, compute N and, only afterwards, test that p A + p B and q A + q B are indeed prime numbers, the generation procedure has to be repeated about n 2 =4 times in order to obtain an RSA modulus N. Boneh In addition to the generic cheating strategy analyzed in theorem 10, Alice can use an input value f p A di erent from p A mod p as input. If she does this, she learns that f p A + p B 6 = 0 mod p, i.e log(p)=p bits of p B . Since Bob cannot know if she tried to cheat, Alice can make the protocol restart until she learns as much information as possible. If we note P the set of tested prime numbers, the information learned by Alice if she is malicious is less than P p2P log(p)=p bits. If P is the set of the rst`prime numbers, this leads to a maximal amount of information less than log(`ln`). As an example, for n = 1024 one can test the rst 200 prime numbers as it is adviced in 24]. With our protocol, Alice can learn at most 9 bits of information about p B .
E ciency improvement
A more e cient and more secure way to choose secret data that have more chance to lead to an RSA modulus consists in choosing p A and p B (resp. q A and q B ) such that p A + p B is not divisible by a very small prime number. More precisely, let M 0 be a product of the rst odd prime numbers such that M 0 2 n=2?1 . The choice of p A and p B by Alice and Bob is performed as follows: In conclusion, an e cient strategy to compute a good N consists in generating p A and p B with this protocol, possibly testing a few more trial divisions, doing the same with q A and q B , computing N and nally testing if N is actually the product of two large prime integers.
It would be interesting to generate an RSA modulus N such that the prime factors p and q are strong primes. We do not know how to achieve this but we can test if (p ? 1)=2 is divisible by small prime numbers or not. To do this, we just use the protocol designed for the trial division test, with the function f(x; y) = 0 if (x + y ? 1)=2 = 0 mod p and f(x; y) = 1 otherwise.
Generation of the Shared Private Keys
When N has been generated and tested, the last step is the choice of a public exponent e and of a secret one d. More In conclusion, our scheme is much more practical than those derived from general solutions while it is still based on very general security assumptions. But the secure computation of a shared RSA keys always seems to need e cient computers linked by high rate networks. We propose in appendix an alternative solution, less general since it is based on a speci c number theoretical problem but that enables very e cient computations and transmissions.
A An E cient Solution Based on Higher Residues Cryptosystem Using a speci c number theoretical problem, we can also propose a much more simple and e cient solution that does not need to perform many rounds of communication. It is based on a trapdoor version of the discrete logarithm problem. More precisely, Alice chooses parameters for the Naccache Stern cryptosystem 19] based on higher residues, i.e a squarefree odd B-smooth integer greater than 2 n , where B is a small integer, an RSA modulus N A such that divides (N A ), g an element whose multiplicative order modulo N A is a large multiple of .
The The security analysis of this protocol is out of the scope of this appendix.
We can just notice that a commitment of p A , p B , q A and q B and a veri cation of the correctness of the result have to be added (as in 4]). This can be done using modular exponentiation and its homomorphic property.
